This paper presents a new key predistribution scheme for sensor networks based on structured graphs. Structured graphs are advantageous in that they can be optimized to minimize the parameter of interest. We discuss various parameters affecting such a scheme.
Another advantage of using structured graphs is that they can be optimized in order to minimize the parameters of interest and guarantee performance. The parameters that we consider in this article are network diameter, the average shortest path length between any two nodes in the network, the clustering coefficient (which measures local connectivity) of nodes and the number of keys a node is required to store.
The EG approach requires the use of a key discovery phase as the sensors do not know with whom they share keys. This entails a broadcast of message to every other node after deployment which is followed by a challenge/response phase [1] . Whereas in our model the keys are distributed in a predetermined fashion and it does not require any key discovery phase. Also, each key can be chosen to be unique, ensuring that only the intended node can decrypt the message and no other nodes can listen in on the conversation.
After the key discovery phase, a node wanting to communicate with a node with which it does not share an encryption/decryption key requires to perform a path discovery phase. There are several problems with path discovery. For example, although there exist ) ( 3 N O algorithms to determine the shortest path to every other node on the network, it requires the knowledge and storage of the complete network topology (or the adjacency matrix of size 2 N ) with the node that wants to discover the shortest path. Since in a random graph the adjacency matrix is not predetermined, every node will have to communicate back and forth to build this matrix. This is an enormous communication burden on the network. Comparatively, in the structured graph approach, we eliminate the path discovery phase and present a predetermined efficient routing algorithm that establishes a worst case path length of ⎡ ⎤ Chan, et. al., [2] proposed the use of a q -composite scheme in which 1 > q keys were to be shared between every pair of nodes in a random graph. Although, this provided better resilience than [1] , it requires an increase in the number of keys to be stored on the nodes or a decrease in pool size. While the first requirement is a burden on memory, decreasing the pool size increases the probability of the same key being reused between more than two nodes. Du, et. al. , [3] and Liu and Ning [4] , propose a threshold scheme in which the adversary needs to compromise more than a threshold number of nodes to compromise the network. While in [6] [7] [8] deployment knowledge is used to reduce the number of keys required to share. In comparison, we only assume that the nodes are within communication range of each other without the need for any specific deployment topology.
II. THE PROPOSED KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
One may view the elements in fig. 1 (a) as nodes in a sensor network arranged in the increasing order of their node ids (1 to N ). An arc between node i and node j indicates that the nodes share a common encryption/decryption key and hence can communicate securely. Further, every node is assumed to have similar connections where each connection is bidirectional because using shared key, the nodes can communicate in both directions.
Consequently, if we say that every node i shares a key
, then the a network with N nodes has ) ( log 2 N N × total connections. Further, since every connection is bidirectional, and the network is symmetric, every node has eds up having 1 )
In order to securely communicate with the nodes with which node i does not directly share an encryption key, the message is routed via multiple hops, in the following manner (the routing protocol):
1. To securely communicate with node q , node i first encrypts the message with the encryption key it shares with node m that is closest to the destination and with which it (node i ) has a direct connection. 2. Node m then decrypts the message, and checks if node q is its direct contact, if it is then node m encrypts the message using the encryption key it shares with node q and sends the message to node q directly. However, if q is not one of m 's direct contacts, then node m locates the next node, node l , that is closest to node q , among its direct contacts and encrypts the message with the encryption key its shares with node l and sends the encrypted message to l . 3. Node l repeats step 2, and so on until the message reaches node q .
The closeness of a node a to node b can be determined by computing (NodeId )
The parameters to be considered in the proposed model for key distribution are the following: Proof: A binary search is performed by repeatedly halving the search interval, resulting in ) ( log 2 N hops to reach any node from a given node on the network of N nodes [5] . Suppose we wish to find the upper bound for the distance between node i and node q on the network. Without loss of generalization, if node q is not a direct contact of node i , then assume that node i contacts one of its direct connections, that is closest to node q and routes the message using the routing algorithm presented above.
Further it is seen that the placement of connections of node i slices the network into pieces such that the largest piece is of size 4 / N . Therefore, node i would, in the worst case, have to contact one of the nodes at the edge of the largest slice.
These nodes would then repeat the process until the destination node is reached by repeatedly dividing the left over region by ¼ at each step. Hence, after m steps, the uncertainity in the location of node q is reduced to = .
Consequently, the destination node (node q ) is reached One can argue that our aim is secure communication between sensor nodes, and to achieve this, the nodes must share an encryption/decryption key, represented by a link between the nodes. Therefore, each node has a "view" that is limited to these direct links. Thus, for the purpose of secure transmission of messages, a node can effectively only "see" its direct links. Theorem 2: The routing protocol described above, results in the shortest possible path, for the given connections, between the starting node and the destination node.
Proof: Since every node's "view" is limited to 1 ) ( log 2 2 − N nodes, it can securely only contact these nodes that are its direct connections. Hence, the best strategy without a global view is to use a greedy approach, i.e. to choose the local best at every node.
Thus, to securely route a message to the destination node, every node sends the message to one of its direct contact that is closest to the destination node. As a consequence, the distance between the starting node and the destination node decreases at each step to the smallest possible at that step, making the algorithm optimal, for the given connections, resulting in the shortest possible path.
The diameter of a network is defined as the longest shortest path among all the pairs of nodes in the network. From theorem 1 and 2 we see that the diameter of the graph is
The second parameter to consider is the average shortest path length for the network. This determines the average number of hops needed to transmit a message securely between any random pairs of nodes. Fig. 2 plots the average shortest path length for network of various sizes using the proposed model. As seen, when the network increases 10 fold from 100 nodes to 1000 nodes, the average path length increases less than 1.5 times. This shows that our model is scalable, i.e. with a very large increase in the network size the average path length only increases by a small fraction. The third parameter that we would like to consider is the number of keys that a node needs to store in order to ensure that the network is connected and maintains a small average path length. We know that in the proposed approach, the minimum number of connections required to ensure network connectivity is just 1. That is, if a every node i shares a key with node 1 + i , (computed modulo N ), then the network is connected. However, this approach results in a average shortest path length of 4 N and a diameter of 2 N .
In order to reduce the path lengths, 1 ) ( log 2 2 − N long distance connections have been introduced, as a result, each node stores 1 ) ( log 2 2 − N keys, when N is a power of 2.
And it varies between 1 ) ( log 2 2 − N and 1 ) 1 ( log 2 2 − + N ,
, for some integer k .
The fourth parameter that we consider is the clustering coefficient. Clustering coefficient measures the local interconnectivity of the nodes and was introduced in [9] . It is expected, in a network, that local communication is comparatively more common than long distance communication. If nodes are deployed such that node ids close to each other are closely located topographically, then they can communicate with each other with very few hops. Fig. 3 shows the clustering coefficient of our model when compared to a random graph.
Node authentication and reuse of keys: Since, every node connection is pre-determined and not randomly chosen, the nodes are aware with which nodes they share keys. Similar, pair-wise key distribution has been discussed in [3] and [4] , however, unlike in our case, they pick the pairs randomly. Advantages of pair-wise key distribution is that we can ensure that each shared key is unique and there is no need for key discovery phase. 
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a scheme for key predistribution in sensor networks. The proposed scheme eliminates the key discovery and path determination problems. We have proposed an efficient routing mechanism that guarantees ⎡ ⎤ 2 ) ( log 2 N diameter and the nodes only store ) (log 2 N O keys.
Further work needs to be done to allow for node failures and node joins. Also, it would be of interest to determine the performance of methods based on structured graphs when only a percentage of nodes are reachable after deployment.
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